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Abstract
This article highlights the consequences of conflicts on the environment and
its management. Environmental conflicts fall under public disputes, which
have been observed to be a result of human needs. This observation is based
on the fact that environmental degradation is more a result of social conflicts
than of bio-physical conditions, and hence eludes attempts to control it.
Numerous international examples of conflicts that have resulted in environ-
mental degradation are highlighted to reinforce this theory. The case for
Lesotho’s environmental degradation is traced from a historic perspective to
present day problems and their manifestations. It concludes by examining the
experiences of the National Environmental Youth Corps (NEYC) project and




degradation. It reviews the mitigation measures put in place by this project
and the first positive signs towards the solution of the environmental degrada-
tion that has ravaged this country for years. It closes by advocating the
equipping of natural resource and land-use planners with conflict analysis
skills if the environment is to be conserved effectively.
Introduction
Timberlake and Tinker (1985) state that there is a growing conviction of a
correlation between environmental degradation and the conflict over natural
resources, which has not been widely documented. Recent research has been
focusing on a few articles on environment and conflict, gradually bringing to
light the impacts of the socio-economic dimensions on environmental 
degradation. This study therefore examines the impacts of the socio-economic
dimensions on the environmental degradation in Lesotho, which has become
second to none in the world. 
According to conflict theory, environmental disputes are considered as a
sub-sector of public disputes by Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), who also
highlight that public disputes come in all shapes and sizes. There are disputes
that occur between communities or between a community and decision-
makers or planners, or within a community. According to Kraybill (1995) the
underlying factor is that environmental conflicts are normally based on human
needs and at local level they tend to be over the allocation, distribution and
management of natural resources. Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) go on to
characterise public/environmental disputes, but the underlying fact is that
they all are different from each other. The general characteristics are:
(i) That new issues and new parties keep on popping up as the negotiations
proceed.
(ii) That such disputes occur at varying levels of expertise: they can simply
be differences over land boundaries, and they can be as complex and
scientific as disputes over the pollution of a river and its impacts on the
health of the communities down stream, which would require chemical
and biological tests on the water and humans involved.
(iii) That they have to deal with different forms or sources of power: one
party could be using legal power and the other party financial power, or
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power differences may be due to the numbers or skills with which each
side is endowed.
(iv) That they normally would have differences in decision-making proce-
dures, e.g. those of government bodies and those of private organisations.
(v) That these disputes normally lack continuity in relationships or even
the wish for a continued relationship after the dispute.
Another factor that Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) highlight, is that in most
cases these public or environmental disputes are splashed in newspapers,
and over TV and radio, which makes their resolution very difficult. Morris
(1999) emphasises the fact that environmental issues tend to involve every-
body in a community. They often arise over benefits or trade-offs between
environmental and economic issues. They can also involve more than one
country, however. Trolldalen (1998) describes International Environmental
Conflicts (IECs) as conflicts that are a result of the utilisation of natural
resources by one country, in a way which has negative environmental conse-
quences for another, or a group of countries. 
The foregoing section has introduced the concept of environmental
conflicts and their complexity, which will undoubtedly contribute to the 
difficulty in resolving or managing them.
It is therefore within these confines that this article attempts to argue
the following: 
Environmental degradation is more a result of social conflicts, which
have not been recognised, than of bio-physical conditions and actions
on the environment, and hence there is a low rate of success in most of
the projects set up to arrest environmental degradation.
This article tries to illustrate that unless it is recognised to what extent 
environmental degradation is a result of conflicts, the world will keep battling
with the wrong issues and fail to make progress on the environment manage-
ment front. The article is divided into two major sections. The first section
highlights international environmental conflicts and their impact on the 
environment, and how they have been managed. The second section
describes the Lesotho case study, showing how conflicts over natural
resources have resulted in devastating environmental degradation and how
attempts that have been embarked on for decades, but have ignored the
conflict dimension, have been fruitless. It looks at the historical perspective
of the problem and concludes by examining the current attempts, which have
taken the conflict dimension into perspective. 
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1. Lessons from International Environmental Conflicts
This section attempts to review conflicts that arise over the management and
utilisation of natural resources or the environment, in order to provide back-
ground evidence for the case study. The issues dealt with here, as outlined by
Morris (1999), are mainly those of the use of environmental resources by an
individual in a way which conflicts with the wishes of the society that the
individual lives in. For example, although land can be purchased and owned
by an individual, the environmental resources on it remain properly public,
and therefore the individual cannot just use them as he/she wants. For
instance, the tree species on a privately owned piece of land might contain
some protected or endangered species, and therefore the public has a right to
object to the land owner’s wish to fell the trees and clear the land. Goldblatt
(1995) says that since land has an intrinsic value and there is scarcity of it, it
is not surprising that conflicts erupt over it. As could have been expected
when people were forcibly removed from their land in South Africa during
apartheid, a lot of conflicts were sparked in those days. This was so because
the people had attached value to the land that they were being moved from.
The conflict over land in South Africa went into a latent phase during the
period of oppression, but as soon as freedom was achieved, all the tribes
started demanding restitution and thus reopened the old conflicts. Therefore
today, a successful land reform process would have to be characterised by the
ability to manage and resolve the disputes over land. Goldblatt (1995) further
highlights how in Saldanha Bay, South Africa, conflicts ensued between
conservationists and industrialists, and how the industrialists eventually won
the cases due to their financial muscle – underscoring the intrinsic value of
land. He also indicates how the conflicts that erupted in Kogelberg over a
future dam, which threatened a special biodiversity park, reflected a clash of
interests between one sector of the community and another.
By means of an example, he shows how a fishing policy should 
accommodate the fishing rights of local communities if conflict is to be
averted. A fishing regulation in the Kariba Dam on the Zimbabwe/Zambian
border required every fisherman to apply for fishing permits, ignoring the fact
that the Tonga people’s staple diet is fish and they had been fishing from the
river for their livelihood long before the dam was built. Hence conflicts
always ensued when dam wardens tried to arrest the local fishermen (Tongas)
as they fished on the Kariba dam without permits. This resulted in the Tonga
community fishing at night to avoid being seen, and consequently catching
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whatever they could get, big or small. This curtailed the continued harvest
from the lake, and re-emphasised the unfortunate results of a lack of negotia-
tions between the local communities and government agents. Goldblatt
(1995) also referred to the conflicts that ensued between developers and 
city residents in South Africa when a new housing development threatened
the environmental and cultural heritage of a city. When conflicts over land or
natural resources erupt, and management falls foul, it leads to the degrada-
tion of the disputed natural resources. 
The examples above re-affirm the fact that environmental conflicts are
public disputes, and hence they range from technical to political issues. Also,
due to their complexity they are difficult to resolve, as highlighted by Kraybill
(1995).
Poonan and Mackenzie (1996) describe how, during the implementation
of the South African Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),
conflicts started due to lack of transparency of an allocation of land claims.
They also describe the conflicts that ensued between ecotourism and mining
lobbies over certain pieces of land. Cousins (1996) focused on conflicts in 
the South African Land Reform Committee between the chiefs and civil 
associations for influential positions within the committee. Conflicts are also
recorded to have occurred between the ‘would be’ beneficiaries of the land
reform and government planners, since the communities were not in agree-
ment with the resource management rules laid down by government. This
further emphasised the intrinsic value of land as seen by Goldblatt (1995), as
well as the lack of proper negotiations over natural resources.
The current Zimbabwe conflict over land is an example of how intense
and violent conflicts over natural resources can get. Chitiyo (2000) describes
this crisis in five stages, which have all turned violent. The first Chimurenga
(guerrilla warfare) of 1890–1929 was the stage when colonialists grabbed the
land and imposed white rule over the country after a number of battles. The
second stage was the period of the Land Apportionment Act, from 1930 to
1959, when the fertile and good land was legally taken away from the black
population and civil resistance ensued. This saw the millions of black
Zimbabweans being pushed on to marginal lands with limited resources,
which resulted in land degradation setting in. He views the third stage as the
second Chimurenga of 1966–1979, when an armed conflict arose, primarily
over the land issue. This saw the destruction of farming infrastructure. 
Dip-tanks were broken or filled with stones, streams were polluted with
chemicals, and forests were burnt by soldiers as they tracked down the
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freedom fighters. The fourth stage was the post independence period,
1980–1997, when land was superficially returned to the black population
through the ‘Land Resettlement Programme’. The Land Reform Programme
resulted in the opening of former conservation areas to land hungry blacks,
who then went in to cut down the trees which had been out of their reach for
decades. They then overstocked the land and overgrazed them, gradually
devegetating the areas, eventually turning them into a state similar to the
communal areas. This was an unpopular process which lacked transparency
and ended prematurely in 1988, allowing this conflict to go into another
latent phase in its escalation. The involvement of the Zimbabwe army in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1997 and the appeasement
gesture given to the war veterans (Z$50 000 per veteran) combined to bring
down the Zimbabwean economy by increasing inflation to over 100 per cent.
This marked the beginning of the fifth stage. This saw the economy of the
country go down, the ruling party becoming increasingly unpopular as the
election approached. Seeing their downfall approaching, their only remaining
card that could turn the stakes of the downward spiralling of the party was to
refocus on the land issue, which they knew was definitely unresolved. This
sparked the current white farm invasions. The result of this has been the frag-
mentation of the land and the plundering of resources as the new settlers
cleared bushes to construct their dwellings and cut trees for fuel-wood. This
shows how decades of misapplied state intervention in agrarian reform can
easily be replaced by grassroots reactions, often in the form of an anarchic
conflict resolution process. Unfortunately all these conflicts are taking place
at a great expense to the environment. They serve as further proof that
mishandled conflicts never go away, but just go into latent phases and only
need a trivial incident to go into an escalation phase again.
A review of refugee activities, which are normally a result of conflicts,
reveals how they affect the environment and lead to further conflicts (UNHCR
1999). Kakonge (2000) describes refugee activity as a sudden influx of large
numbers of people into areas without any planning or any provisions made for
them. In the receiving area, they tend to cause competition for resources like
fuel-wood, timber for construction, water and fertile land for cropping; hence
tensions between them and the receiving communities become inevitable. He
notes that even when assistance is given, it is only food supplies and does not
include the energy to cook the food. Therefore, for as long as they are there, the
refugees will depend on the local environment for the energy source to cook
their food. In these camps, deforestation and cropping lead to devegetation,
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which leads to soil erosion and eventually results in desertification. It should
be noted here that in all refugee situations the assistance is only given to the
refugees and not the receiving communities. Trolldalen (1998), highlighting
the evidence from Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe during the 1980s and
the refugees in the Horn of Africa, describes in detail the kind of environ-
mental destruction that refugees cause – from water pollution to deforestation,
from soil erosion to food shortages for the receiving communities. On the other
hand, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees alludes to the fact
that if environmental degradation or conflicts between the refugees and the
resident population are not addressed, it undermines the effectiveness of their
programmes. This is an acknowledgement of the negative impacts of refugees
on the environment. Although refugees are not expected to put environmental
considerations before their safety and welfare, they are expected to minimise
their environmental impacts, hence reducing the conflicts with the receiving
communities. Suhrke (1994) looks at the problem from the angle of environ-
mental degradation, which causes environmental refugees to be viewed as
victims as well as sources or perpetrators of conflicts in the receiving areas. He
alludes to the fact that refugees can destabilise states as they move across
borders, and that when they move into urban areas, they contribute to fast and
uncontrolled urbanisation which is unstable and conflict prone. This definitely
causes more environmental degradation in terms of sanitation problems, water
pollution and other problems for the receiving community, which may initiate
another cycle of new conflicts. This further confirms the spiralling of conflicts
as described by Mitchell (1981). 
In describing the relationship between development, environment and
conflict, Friedman (1994) discusses negotiated development as opposed to
development that is imposed on a community. He alludes to the fact that
development is conflictual since it destroys some things and creates some
things. It destroys the social relationships in a society; hence it can trigger
conflicts or violence from threatened communities. Kraybill (1995) describes
development as a process that raises expectations and brings change to a
society, which always results in conflicts and disagreements, either within the
community or between communities, or between the communities and plan-
ners. He further alludes to the fact that although on the surface it might look
as if the people are competing over resources, the real causes of the conflict
are usually much deeper. The actual cause might be that the community
needs to be involved, recognised and/or acknowledged in the development
that is taking place. Therefore, if the planner does not address such needs, a
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seed of bitter conflict would have been sown. Payne (1998) emphasises that
in order to avoid conflicts that are a result of environmental problems,
sustainable development might be the answer. He alluded to the phenomenon
that environmentally caused conflicts tend to erupt in poor countries, which
are not in a position to implement sustainable development. It is therefore
necessary to note that development can cause negative environmental
impacts, which can lead to conflicts, and the conflicts could result in a further
environmental degradation and so the cycle continues.
Morris (1999) examines two methods of resolving environmental
conflicts or public disputes: the traditional one and an alternative method-
ology. The traditional method of resolution is arbitration by a government
official, but this method does not allow full comprehension of the environ-
mental and economic facts involved in the case. It utilises laws and
precedents in earlier judgements, and therefore works against the facts. Each
environmental dispute is different from others, and the parties could even be
coming from completely different cultures. The precedents may therefore be
rendered irrelevant. The settlement in this method is through a third party
and not through the parties themselves. Therefore, disputing parties never 
get into direct interaction to disconfirm their negative perceptions of each
other. The parties never really get to know and understand each other. The
likelihood is that any settlement reached in this way will not last for very long
because it will need to be policed by an external party, which is normally not
possible. The alternative method is that of market-based contracts, which was
developed by Coase in 1960. This method allows for the deep understanding
of the environmental facts, and for direct negotiations between parties. 
It allows parties to iron out differences in perceptions that normally lead to
conflict escalation. It depends on open exchanges of information and under-
standing of each other’s interests, since it is better to comprehend each other
than to alienate each other. This method is weak as far as fairness is
concerned, so its fairness can only be of value for localised environmental
damage. In conclusion, Morris (1999) settled for a hybrid between the two
methods, which uses the power of the market-based system to motivate and
facilitate efficient settlements while preserving the perceived fairness and
legitimacy of the legal/tradition system.
Murphree and Wright (1996) critically evaluate the co-optation method-
ology as a framework for the resolution of environmental conflicts. They
observed that it has three steps or facets, i.e. channelling, inclusion 
and salience control. Channelling works well with orderly and reliable 
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communities, but not with disorganised and fragmented communities.
Institutionalising might be seen as an attempt at neutralising the opposition
parties. The conditions for channelling are that it has to be focused at the
leadership that has a majority control, and that it has to be considered in 
difficult situations. In fact, the bigger the threat, the better it is to use this
method. The co-optation method should be regarded as a risk, however, since
the community can later be hostile if they discover that this method was used
on them. Inclusion involves including the opposite side or the antagonists in
the decision-making process, even if their input does not affect the outcome.
Their participation in the process increases their commitment and their
acceptance of the decision, since they will always feel that they are part and
parcel of the decision. This method was effectively used in Zimbabwe’s first
parliament where the main opposition party, Zimbabwe African Peoples’
Union (ZAPU), which had only 20 out of 100 seats, was included in the
government. Although they could never change any decision, they felt they
were part of the government. Salience control is the third facet of this triangle.
It is the appeasement of a group over critical issues, by making it appear as if
those issues are being addressed, so the opposition parties do not have to
push them to the forefront anymore. A warning is that this might work in the
earlier stages, but later co-optation may be recognised and that may lead to
the discreditation of the negotiation process. Therefore, it might be a good 
candidate for environmental conflict resolution, but is to be used with caution
in case it backfires.
Campbell and Floyd (1996) examined the use of negotiation or mediated
negotiation as a framework for environmental conflict resolution. They
alluded to the fact that although it might be faster and cheaper to litigate
when one looks at global issues, the decision may be longer lasting and more
satisfactory if it is made from negotiation or mediated negotiation. Carpenter
and Kennedy (1988), as well as Susskind and Ozanwa (1984) have shown
evidence of this. Campbell and Floyd (1996) observed that environmental
mediation has developed as a sub-field of dispute resolution, but that,
although it has been used extensively, it is still unresolved when mediation
should be used as an appropriate tool for environmental disputes. Some of 
the conditions that are required for mediation are a situation when there is a
relative balance of power, and one in which the conflict has reached an
impasse. In addition Campbell & Floyd (1996) introduced the role of the
development or environmental planner into the environmental conflict
matrix. He observed that although the planner is a technician, in most cases
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he has to double up as a politician or a hybrid of the two. It will also be an
advantage for the planner to be a negotiator or mediator in order for him to be
democratic in the planning process. This is a quality that most planners do
not possess, which explains the difficulties they face in the planning process
and also the number of unimplemented plans.
Griggs (1996) explores how the study and the comprehension of culture
would assist in understanding environmental conflicts and in attempting to
resolve them. He says that because environmental conflicts are so linked to
communities, it is important to understand the four myths of culture. Firstly,
‘Culture is a product of tradition’, hence successful cultures are those that
adjust and respond to the changing physical, social and economic constraints
of their environment. Secondly, ‘Culture is environmentally determined’,
hence people choose a variety of adaptation strategies within environmental
constraints. Thirdly, ‘Culture is an anachronism and will disappear with
modernization’, but although culture is socially constructed, it cannot be
dismissed that easily, because an imposition of new culture could meet with
violent resistance. Lastly, ‘Culture is equivalent to ethnicity and race’, but it
is much wider than ethnicity and smaller than race. Griggs concluded by
saying that culture has to be recognised as an active force with the task of
creating a harmonious balance between the people and the environment. 
All these theories are illustrated by Weaver (1996), when he examined the
management of two swamps in East Africa. One was managed by the use of
legislation, fences and armed guards, which resulted in community conflict.
The other was managed by local action through negotiations, and this method
conserved the swamp in a harmonious manner with no conflicts. He
concludes by stressing that outsiders will not produce the expected results; it
is the internally generated action that will bring pride within the community
and will bring conflict-free management of the environment.
Linsell and McDaid (1996) more or less concur with Griggs (1996) by
saying people want control of their lives and their environment. They some-
times therefore go into conflict with environmental groups that want them to
choose between their livelihood and saving the environment. If they are
consulted on how they would combine the two, the result will be non-
conflictual. This re-emphasises the importance of local consultations and
internal solutions. Lyster (1990) advocates alternative methods to litigation
for environmental conflicts. He argues for civil enforcement, and negotiating
for compliance, and recommends the use of dispute resolution where judicial
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enforcement has failed. Finally, he propagates the use of the land utilisation
planner as a mediator, since he regards this as one of the most effective
methods. This is reinforced by Fowkes (1992) who highlighted that the
involvement of the public in all the stages of development and policy making
will ensure that conflicts do not come up in the future. She highlights four
critical stages for involvement: the people should be part of the assembly
(‘forming’), and then they should be involved in the debate (‘storming’), in the
setting of norms (‘norming’), and in the implementation of the policies 
that would have been developed (‘performing’). If these suggestions are
followed by environmental authorities, conflicts may become to be a feature
of the past.
Finally, this paper would briefly like to examine how International
Environmental Conflicts (IECs) are managed. Trolldalen (1998 chap. 3)
divides the management of IECs into two categories, non-legal and legal. The
non-legal approach is to identify the threats, assess them and the causes,
report on them and advise on how to avert the conflict. Another approach of a
non-legal kind has been highlighted as the development of ‘soft laws’ such as
guidelines, resolutions, recommendations and standards. Such approaches,
however, should be coupled with national institutional building for monitoring
purposes. On the other hand, IECs can be managed through a legal process,
such as the production of international treaties or laws, or the documentation
of customary laws. In this light, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) has a mandate to co-ordinate environmental action globally, and to
manage and/or minimise the chances of IECs through monitoring and
assessing the development of action plans and of new legal instruments. To
date, the UN has been heavily criticised for its approach of merely addressing
the manifestations of IECs instead of attending to the underlying causes.
It is strongly believed that environmental conflicts can be effectively
managed if all the foregoing experiences are taken into account. One would
like to see a situation where most personnel that deal with environmental
issues have been trained in conflict management techniques so that environ-
mental conflict mitigation will be part of the environmental planning process.
Since it is a generally agreed principle that ‘prevention is better than cure’,
environmental conflict mitigation will definitely be cheaper and more effective
than environmental conflict management or resolution, or attending to the
consequences of environmental conflicts.
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2. The Lesotho Case Study
The Conflict Ridden History of Lesotho
The environmental conflicts in Lesotho have had their underlying causes and
their impacts or consequences. Various attempts have been undertaken to
manage or resolve these conflicts. Lesotho’s environmental problems have
reached unprecedented proportions today because attempts to solve them
have always focused on the ‘green issues’ or physical environment, totally
ignoring the ‘brown issues’ of the social, cultural and political aspects of the
environment. It is to be hoped, therefore, that an analysis of the conflict
dimension will contribute to a new beginning of taking a more pragmatic and
genuine approach towards addressing the environmental degradation that we
have seen to date as a result of conflicts. 
The creation of the Lesotho Kingdom was ‘a crisis foretold’. Lesotho, a
small mountainous kingdom completely surrounded by the Republic of South
Africa, occupies 30 400 square kilometres. Prior to the establishment of
Lesotho as a country, the Basotho people occupied the whole of the present
Free State Province of South Africa and the present day Kingdom of Lesotho
(Lelimo 1998). As the Boer Trekkers moved north from the Cape Province in
the 1830s, they temporarily settled in the sweet grasslands and eventually
started fighting the Basotho. As the war ensued the Basotho retreated to their
defensive posts in the mountains, leaving about 75 per cent of their original
land to the Boers (descendants of the Dutch). As the Boers continued to 
push them, the Basotho king asked for protection from the British, who then
established the Basotholand Protectorate under King Moshoeshoe I. By that
time, most of what Lelimo (1998) calls ‘the conquered territory’ had already
been lost to the Boers and so became the ‘Orange Free State’.
In this unfolding crisis, the Orange Free State retained the flat to gentle
undulating land, which was fertile, potentially arable and provided good
grazing land. The newly established, tiny Lesotho Kingdom retained only 
25 per cent of the original land of the Basotho. Moreover, this part consisted
of rugged, unfertile land, of which only about 13 per cent was potentially
arable. The Basotho people are traditionally livestock keepers, but since they
had been driven out of their grazing lands with their large numbers of animals
into the rugged mountains, they had very little choice except to adapt to the
mountains. The Basotho as a tribe have strong cultural affiliations, however,
and these were further strengthened by the threat of the Boers. This fact is
confirmed by Martinussen (1988) who states that tribal and cultural ties get
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stronger under threat of losing identity. Therefore, although they were now
mountain dwellers, they would not accept the loss of their cultural identity as
keepers of livestock. Therefore, as their population inevitably increased with
time, the livestock numbers increased proportionally. Also, as the population
increased, more land came under the plough until eventually the people
started crop farming on the fragile mountain slopes and using the mountains
for grazing on a continuous basis, instead of the original seasonal grazing. It
therefore became clear right from day one of the kingdom that it will not be a
sustainable kingdom unless there was a safety valve somewhere, either by
absorption of the excess population into industries in urban areas or by
expanding the size of the land. The reality was, however, that none of these
options took place, and hence the crisis foretold is with us today.
Lesotho’s Environmental Crisis and Impacts
It is an established fact in literature that globally, soil erosion in Lesotho is
only second to that of Ethiopia. The question to be asked is whether land
degradation, and specifically soil erosion, is the real problem, or whether this
is just a symptom of problems with deep-rooted causes. It has to be under-
stood that soil erosion is the final stage/product of a chain of events. From ‘the
crisis foretold’ perspective, it was clear that overpopulation and overstocking
would lead to serious problems. A population of 2 million people on an area of
30 400 square kilometres has 0.0152 sq km or 15.2 ha per capita, but if food
can be produced on only about 9.4 per cent of the total area, this translates 
to 1.43 ha per capita. Therefore, the overcrowded population started
encroaching into the foothills for more cropland and into the high mountains
for grazing, hence degrading these fragile marginal lands. The large number
of animals overgrazed the strips of uncropped land in the lowlands and in the
fragile mountain ecosystem. The people cut down the trees to build more
shelter and opened up more croplands exposing these fragile marginal lands
to further degradation. These cycles were repeated, resulting in deforestation
and overgrazing, and leading to complete devegetation of the areas.
Therefore, as it rained on bare steep slopes, soil erosion set in. The steep
slopes and generally rugged terrain exacerbated the erosion process. At this
point, the agents of desertification set in as the topsoil was lost, and desicca-
tion of the subsoil resulted in the production of a hard impervious layer which
increased the amount of surface run-off, and thus another cycle of erosion
begun. Without belabouring the point on environmental degradation, it can
be concluded by saying that the environmental problems or land degradation
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are characterised by devegetation, soil erosion, and desertification. However,
the factors causing, accelerating and perpetuating the process were a result of
social issues; hence the need to review and examine the conflict dimension of
the environmental crisis in this country.
It should be noted here that from the onset a crisis resulted from a
conflict over natural resources, and that when the British intervened, they
only protected what was remaining in terms of land instead of looking at the
problem and at what lay in the future of these people who had lost most of
their land and its natural resources. This conflict then translated from a
conflict between the Boers and the Basotho people to a dispute between the
Basotho and the British administrators and land-use planners during British
rule when the British tried to rationalise the use of the land (Lelimo 1998).
When the planners stipulated the livestock carrying capacity of the land and
translated it to what each family could have, this became a problem since the
number of animals per household was unacceptably low and continued to be
reduced as the population increased. When the country got its independence
in 1966, this dispute shifted from the British to the national government plan-
ners and the land users. Any form of control on the number of animals and 
the size of land for each family’s crops was viewed negatively as repression by
the government. Unfortunately the communities could not appreciate or
understand that the planners, whether British or local, were only making an
assessment of the capacity of the land resources and passing it down to the
people. The people at village level saw it as an infringement of their rights.
All these refusals and resistance resulted in the collapse of contour ridges,
and in overstocking, deforestation, erosion and eventually desertification.
Later this conflict transformed into inter-community and intra-community
conflicts as the reality got closer to home, and as the competition for the
limited resources became a reality in the villages. As the problem further
manifested itself, conflicts ensued between neighbouring communities over
use of limited resources like grazing areas, water resources and tree
resources. Each community guarded its resources jealously, resulting in
boundary disputes between chieftainship areas. Gradually, as the sharing of
resources within the community or village got tighter, disputes arose between
members of the same village when each member could not get enough land
for cropping, grazing for their animals or enough trees for fuel-wood and
construction. The communal land tenure system exacerbated the situation in
the grazing lands, since it was a free for all situation. Everybody tried to
extract as much as they could as fast as they could, in the true form of the
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‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). What then became the results and
impacts of these conflicts at the various levels in the system was land degra-
dation, visible as soil erosion, deforestation and desertification, to such an
extent that Lesotho became ‘famous’ for its gullies. This is a social problem
which has transformed itself into an environmental catastrophe. It serves to
illustrate how conflicts over the use of land and other natural resources leads
to the degradation of the same resources. It also illustrates how this starts a
vicious cycle where the degraded environment can only support a fraction of
the pre-determined numbers of animals and this kick-starts a second spiral of
the conflict which is more intense than the first one, true to the conflict
spirals of Mitchell (1981). This therefore is a case study within which several
conflict theories have been seen to come true, like the typical phenomenon,
highlighted by Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), of new issues popping up
during negotiations about public conflicts.
The next section analyses what the response has been to this environ-
mental catastrophe. The basic response has been to attend to the damaged
environment, which meant attending to the symptoms, and this has proved to
have been a complete misperception of what the problem was and still is.
Environmental Rehabilitation: A Historical Review
There have been various attempts to stop the escalating environmental 
degradation and more specifically soil erosion. Environmental degradation
and soil erosion have been talked about in Lesotho for over 40 years, since
the colonial days. It is interesting to note that as attempt after attempt was
made to halt the soil erosion, it kept on increasing. It was not only the density
of the gullies that increased, but they got wider, deeper and longer by the
season. This should have been viewed as an indicator that the wrong
approach was being used or that attention was being focused in a direction
that was not yielding any positive results.
One of the earliest documented attempts was that by the British in the
early 1960s when they introduced the contour ridges. They brought in
mechanical equipment to construct the structures on the farmers’ lands
without the farmers fully understanding or agreeing to what was being done.
This led to lack of maintenance of the structure, rendering a good technology
useless. It was a clear case of attending to the symptoms rather than the core
of the problem. The Thaba Bosiu Project was another attempt in the 1970s to
curb the increasing soil erosion. After the termination of each project, the
structures collapsed and channelled water into gullies resulting in deep 
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incisions. The Phuthiatsana Project in the 1980s also had an element of soil
conservation, and this was followed by the FAO’s Soil and Water Conservation
Project (SOWACO). These were followed by the GTZ, Matelile Project, which
focused on soil conservation, and the Production Through Conservation 
(PTC I) project which culminated in PTC II. 
It was only the PTC II project that started noticing the social conflict
aspect of the problem and began actively asking for people’s participation and
opinions throughout the whole process, from planning through to implementa-
tion. The peculiar aspect of all these attempts was that they focused on the
rehabilitation of the physical environment. They concentrated on the amount
and intensity of the rainfall, the slope of the land, and the resulting impacts
on the environment, but – although agricultural extension services were
available – nobody ever tried to understand the underlying causes of why the
people were part and parcel of the degradation of the land. 
The Experiences of the National Environmental Youth 
Corps Project
The experiences of this NEYC project, which took some lessons from PTC II,
are elaborated in the following sections. The NEYC is a United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) project which was set up as a response to
the United Nations Conference for Environmental Development (UNCED)
1992, which focused on environmental rehabilitation and management by
unemployed youth. The objectives of the NEYC project were two pronged,
that is, to rehabilitate the rural and urban environment and at the same time
to create employment for the multitudes of unemployed youth who make up
about 41 per cent of the population. This project paid the youth a small
allowance while they were being trained to rehabilitate their local environ-
ments under the joint supervision of the project and the village leadership.
The youth were nominated for the project by the village leadership and the
areas to be rehabilitated were identified by the village leadership. The
community participation started right from the initial meetings of the whole
village, at which the project concept was introduced, and continued when the
selection of the youth and of areas for rehabilitation took place. A two-way
dialogue was established and maintained by having follow-up meetings and
workshops periodically to get feedback from the village on whether what was
happening was agreeable and whether they were noticing the benefits to the
youth, the community at large, and their local environment. By involving the
communities in this way the project management thought it had everything
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that was needed to reverse the environmental degradation as per the project
design. The project concentrated on activities like establishment of plant
nurseries, afforestation programmes, rehabilitation of dongas/gullies, road
drainage in the rural areas and solid waste management, including recycling
of waste materials, for urban areas. No conflicts were expected to ensue from
the project, since this was an empowerment and participatory environmental
project. Conflicts did arise, however, out of this supposedly well designed and
well implemented project, and these are highlighted below.
First and foremost, the selection of only 20 per cent of the youth to take
part in the project generated the first type of conflict. Although the project
was fully aware of this factor, the assumption was that if the village as an
entity were asked to select the youth themselves on a Village Development
Council (VDC) basis, they would amicably agree on who should be engaged
in the project. What was not evident was that in an area where poverty and
unemployment rates for this category of youth were running at 65–70 per
cent, this was enough to open a ‘pandora box’ (Sibanda 2000). In reality every
parent who had a qualifying youth wanted his/her own child to be engaged,
not that of the neighbours. 
The project also took too lightly the possibility of conflicts arising from
other factors. Firstly, the village is basically a conglomeration of relatives. So
that a parent may think: ‘If my child is not selected, his cousin may be in’. In
reality, therefore, the project became a struggle, positioning brother against
brother and cousin against cousin. Secondly, the amount that was going to be
paid as an allowance to the youth was only R200.00 per month for year 1,
R100.00 monthly for year 2 and R50.00 monthly for year 3. The project was
worried that this was too small an amount, so it would be difficult even to
recruit enough youth for the project. On the contrary, every youth in the
village wanted to be in it and every parent backed his or her own child,
because in a family where nobody had an income this was a lot of 
money which would be paid consistently. A third factor that contributed to the 
pre-implementation conflict was that the VDC, which is made up of 3 or 4
villages, was supposed to select an area (watershed) where the youth group
would do some consolidated rehabilitation work. In reality, this had to be in
one of the village areas and could not be in all of them. Therefore, the villages
within the same VDC started fighting about which village was going to benefit
from the rehabilitation while the others were only going to supply youth
labour and only get partial benefits of the project. From the above narration
one can already visualise that within a week after arrival in each area this
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project was no longer as welcome as it had been envisaged at the district
level. This started a nightmare within which the project, which had not been
prepared for such conflict, had to operate for the next four years.
The bottom line to this unveiling nightmare was that it was on the money
that the community focused, rather than on the environmental rehabilitation
and proper management of the environment, on which the project was
focused. Therefore the intra-village conflicts and inter-village conflicts
worked against the achievement of the projects objective. At the initial
project-introductory meetings at village level, the project negotiated with the
villagers to allocate the gullied area for rehabilitation on a permanent basis to
the youth group, and the villagers agreed to this without thinking about it
deeply and examining the implications and consequences. The project
viewed this as an incentive to the landless youth, and the villagers were not
worried about giving the degraded land away since it was valueless. But the
physical impact that the project produced in these areas within 6–8 months
made the elders in the village change their minds about the allocation. As a
result of the high rate of erosion, the gullies filled up with the fertile topsoil
from surrounding fields and these former gullies turned into lavish green
valleys within a season or two. What once had been valueless land was now
valuable land that was admired within the village. The village elders and
VDC members who were supposed to assist the youth whenever they needed
help, started alleging that these few youth were going to get double benefits,
i.e. receiving a cash allowance and then receiving the land they could reha-
bilitate. The form ‘C’ (a lease document) that the village chief was supposed
to prepare for the legalisation of the transfer was therefore never completed.
These problems gradually demoralised the youth as they could not accom-
plish what they had been trained to do or achieve their objectives, hence the
rate of environmental rehabilitation slowed down.
Another issue that sparked some more conflict in the village was the
fact that built into the project was an aspect of skills training for the youth
leading to environment-related income-generating projects. This would
continuously provide an income to the group even after the funded phase of
the project. The VDC and chief had been asked at the initial stages of the
project to allocate another piece of land for the income-generating project,
and in principle this was agreed. When the time for the income-generating
projects came (9 to 15 months later), it became one of the most difficult issues
for the village to deal with. This was seen as a third benefit to the few youth
who had already been privileged. It started a conflict between the youth group
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and the village elders, hence confirming Kraybill’s (1995) theory that says
development brings conflict, because these formerly peaceful villages were
now in so much conflict within themselves and between each other just
because of this environmental development project.
Consequences of the Conflicts
Although the project focused on rehabilitation and proper management of the
environment, it resulted in disputes, jealousies as well as negative impacts on
the environment which the project was supposed to conserve. These conflicts
were manifested in the following ways. As the youth group constructed the
soil conservation structures, some members of the village would destroy them
by driving animals over them. Some members from the village would allow
the out-planted tree seedlings to be grazed, after they were moved out of the
fenced nursery/garden. Animals would be driven into the nursery to feed on
and destroy the tree seedlings and vegetables being grown for sale by the
youth group. After the tree seedlings were out-planted in the catchment
areas/watersheds under rehabilitation to increase the vegetation cover, they
would either be uprooted or grazed within a few weeks, rendering the efforts
of the youth to fully rehabilitate these areas virtually useless. Therefore, the
catchment areas, which were not supposed to be grazed for a season or two,
were constantly violated by certain members of the community, especially at
night. Reports about these violations to the village leadership yielded no
punitive action to curb this behaviour. In some instances, the garden fences
were stolen from the nursery/garden leaving the vegetables and seedlings
unprotected. In some instances, as the youth group was trying to build the
chicken or poultry houses for income generation, the walls would be
constantly destroyed during the night. The female members of the group were
constantly harassed on their way to and from work on a daily basis. These acts
discouraged the youth groups and at most sites they never saw any of their
tree seedlings grow to full size trees. Therefore, what was set out to be a
village project to benefit all members of the village directly or indirectly,
caused all these conflicts with the result that the benefits were small or only
short-lived. Meanwhile, the tree seedlings died, erosion continued, devegeta-
tion continued and desertification continued to take a grip on the country. The
initial objectives of putting some of the rehabilitated lands back to production
were never realised fully at more than half the sites.
Another aspect of the project which was hardly achieved, was the objec-
tive to increase the vegetation cover. As a matter of fact, some members of the
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village complained that the project was taking away their grazing land and
putting it under tree plantations, hence they were not going to allow the tree
seedlings to grow into plantations. These allegations were not being aired for
the first time, because some woodlots, which were planted under the World
Bank’s ‘Woodlot Project’, had been set on fire even when they were fully
grown. This was done by communities in conflict over land rights and area
boundaries.
The positive impacts on the environment were obviously not as could be
expected from a project designed to rehabilitate the environment. It only
demonstrated that it is possible to do something about the extensive erosion
or to rehabilitate the lands damaged as a result of earlier conflicts. What it
mainly demonstrated, however, was how the environment suffers as a conse-
quence of conflicts between communities, especially if the disputes are over
land or some natural resources. It also showed how even the quest to improve
the environment has resulted in conflicts. There are many more examples that
can be highlighted to illustrate how the environment is usually the victim of
conflicts.
NEYC Conflict Mitigation Measures
This section highlights the current measures being undertaken by the NEYC
project to remedy the situation described above. Although the problems
discussed above paint a gloomy picture, the project was largely successful to
the extent that the government of Lesotho decided to have a second phase and
to expand the project by having the project recruit more youth. The project
management then decided that before Phase II was implemented it was
necessary to look into the problems of Phase I. This took the form of work-
shops with a representative part of the traditional leadership (chiefs) and the
elected local government leadership (Village Development Councils) in each
district. The workshops were a combination of fact-finding and problem-
solving training forums. Between 60 and 400 leaders per district were
workshopped in groups of about 60–70 per group, depending on the district
size and the number of chiefs and VDCs. A report was compiled for each
district highlighting the perceptions and problems and this resulted in a
combined report highlighting the commonalities among the various areas and
the strategy devised for phase II of the project.
In addition to what was learnt from the conflicts themselves, the project
learnt a couple of key lessons in these frank and open discussion forums.
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Although the chief was made an ex officio member of the VDC at the creation
of this structure, in practice there was still a power struggle between these
two institutions, namely the traditional and the elected leaders of the people.
This resulted in a village polarised between the two. Hence where the project
worked closely with one side, the other side was busy inciting the people to
destroy what was being done. This was aggravated by the fact that the leaders
were always trained separately and each did not have the terms of reference
of the other, since up until 1998 they reported to different ministries. 
Although the VDCs were supposed to be development agents of govern-
ment, the truth of the matter was that they were elected on party political lines
and they saw themselves as party representatives rather than government
agents. Whatever development was spearheaded by the VDC was seen as
promoting the ruling party, hence the opposition parties saw it fit to destroy
the work or incite people to destroy it.
Another conflict unearthed in these workshops was that there is an
intra-structural conflict within the local government structures themselves,
i.e. between the VDC and the District Development Council (DDC). Although
the DDC is normally made up of the secretary and chairperson from each
Ward Development Council (WDC), which in turn had similar representatives
from the VDC, there was some communication breakdown between the three.
Basically the WDCs were not functional, hence what was discussed at the
VDC level was not filtering through to the DDC. Similarly, whatever the
project management discussed at the district with DDC never filtered down to
the VDC where the project was being implemented. This culminated in an
information flow problem, which normally resulted in more conflicts.
Land allocation was another controversial subject between the VDCs
and the chiefs. The chief believed that it was his sole jurisdiction to allocate
land as per powers entrusted to him by the king, but on the other hand the
VDC Act says that the VDC with the chief perform the land allocation duties.
So the project was always caught between the two. If it got the land for the
youth from the VDC, the chief would still go ahead and allocate that piece of
land to somebody else just to cause confusion. In some areas, the VDC
members never attended meetings or did any of their duties because they saw
no point in doing anything since they were not remunerated, while the chiefs
were remunerated. In these areas development plans lagged behind and it
was always difficult to get any commitment on anything from the VDCs,




It is hoped that this case study has highlighted the complex relationship
between the environment, development and conflict and how they impact on
each other. What it portrays clearly, is that community conflicts, disputes or
disagreements are manifested in different ways but in most cases the manifes-
tations have negative impacts on the environment. The unfortunate aspect is
that planners, environmentalists and development agents never examine the
social conflict dimension of the problems and programmes that they are
looking into, because they do not possess the extra lens provided by conflict
management skills. It is this extra lens that is needed in development 
planning to move the development to the next level by being able to take care
of the conflict dimension and being able to understand the conflicts and 
mitigate their impacts. The lack of this expertise has always left the jobs half-
baked without a full understanding of the root causes of the problems that
would be under scrutiny. It is a wish and a hope that the recognition of the
conflict dimension in environmental management issues will open a new
chapter, which might produce great strides in the proper management of the
environment.
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